How Secondary-Market Buyers Price Pre-IPO Stock Against the 409A
By VestedGrant Editorial · Updated · Tax year 2026 · 6 min read
George Inness, Catskill Mountains, 1870 A secondary buyer prices private common stock by its own expected payout, not by the 409A. The 409A is a tax valuation, presumed reasonable for up to 12 months if done by an independent appraiser. Buyers discount for preferred stock that is paid first in a sale, for years of waiting with no way to sell, and for limited information, so bids can land well below the 409A or, for fast-rising companies, above it.
Facts checked November 21, 2026 · Figures for tax year 2026 · 3 sources
Key takeaways
- A 409A valuation by an independent appraiser is presumed reasonable for a date no more than 12 months before the option grant or other transaction it is used for.
- Treasury regulations say a valuation is not reasonable if it fails to reflect material information that became available after it was calculated.
- Liquidation preferences mean common stock receives nothing in sales below the preference stack, which lowers its expected value relative to a simple pro rata share.
- A buyer who must wait years for liquidity and wants a set annual return discounts the expected payout for that time, which can cut the price sharply.
- Secondary bids observed on platforms such as Forge, Nasdaq Private Market, EquityZen and Clarity (formerly Hiive) are evidence of what buyers will pay, not of fair value for tax purposes.
On this page (show sections)
- What does a 409A valuation measure?
- Why does the preference stack lower the value of common stock?
- How do time and marketability lower the price?
- Why does information asymmetry matter to buyers?
- How does the type of buyer change the price?
- How does a stale 409A compound the gap?
- How do sellers set a realistic reserve price?
- Questions people ask next
- Sources
Consider a hypothetical employee who lists 10,000 shares of common stock on a secondary platform. The company’s most recent 409A valued the common at $18 a share, and buyers are bidding $11. The first reaction is that the buyers are lowballing. The more useful reaction is to ask what an outside buyer is paying for: shares that cannot influence the company, cannot force a sale, may wait years for liquidity and sit behind preferred stock that is paid first in an acquisition.
Secondary markets for private company stock, including Forge, Nasdaq Private Market, EquityZen and Clarity (formerly Hiive), match sellers with outside buyers. Their prices reflect what a marginal buyer will pay, which can differ a great deal from the 409A, a valuation prepared for tax purposes. For a fast-growing company, bids can exceed a stale 409A; for others, they can sit far below it.
This guide covers what a 409A measures, the factors that drive a secondary buyer’s price, a worked example, and how sellers use observed bids.
What does a 409A valuation measure?
A 409A valuation estimates the fair market value of a private company’s common stock, mainly so that stock options can be granted with an exercise price no lower than fair value. Treasury regulations under Section 409A say a valuation must take into account the factors that matter to value, including control premiums or discounts for lack of marketability.
A valuation by an independent appraiser is presumed reasonable if it is as of a date no more than 12 months before the option grant or other transaction it is used for. The regulations also say that using an earlier value is not reasonable if it fails to reflect material information that became available after it was calculated, such as a new financing or an important legal outcome.
Two consequences follow. A 409A is a tax valuation with its own purpose and methods, not a market price. And because many companies update it about once a year or after major events, it can lag the market in either direction.
Why does the preference stack lower the value of common stock?
The preference stack lowers the value of common stock because preferred holders are paid their liquidation preference before common holders receive anything in an acquisition. In a sale below the preference stack, common stock can receive nothing; in a larger sale, preferred holders convert and everyone shares pro rata.
Take a hypothetical company with 100 million fully diluted shares: 40 million preferred shares carrying a $900 million 1x non-participating liquidation preference, and 60 million common shares and options. A buyer models three outcomes:
| Outcome | Probability | Exit value | What preferred takes | Common per share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low exit | 25% | $600 million | All $600 million (below the preference) | $0 |
| Middle exit | 50% | $2 billion | $900 million preference (better than 40% of $2 billion) | $1.1 billion divided by 60 million, about $18.33 |
| Large exit or IPO | 25% | $5 billion | Converts to common (40% of $5 billion beats $900 million) | $50 |
The expected payout per common share is 25% times $0, plus 50% times about $18.33, plus 25% times $50, or about $21.67. The expected exit value across the three outcomes is $2.4 billion, or $24 a share if every share were treated alike, so the preference stack alone takes the common’s expected value down to about 90% of that simple figure in this illustration. A company with a larger preference stack relative to its likely exit value would show a bigger gap.
How do time and marketability lower the price?
Time and marketability lower the price because a secondary buyer cannot resell private shares easily and may wait years for an IPO or acquisition. The buyer gives up the use of that money and takes on the risk that conditions worsen, so it pays less today for a payout expected later.
Continue the example. Suppose the buyer expects an exit in about three years and wants a 20% annual return for the risk and illiquidity. The price the buyer can pay today is about $21.67 divided by 1.2 to the third power (1.728), or about $12.54 a share. A buyer that expects an exit in two years pays about $15.05; one that expects five years pays about $8.71. Each assumption here is illustrative, but the pattern holds: the longer and less certain the wait, the larger the discount.
The transfer process adds to this. A private sale typically involves company review under a right of first refusal, company consent and transfer agent processing before cash changes hands, and some buyers price the delay and the chance the company takes the deal.
Why does information asymmetry matter to buyers?
Information asymmetry matters because an employee and an outside buyer know very different things about the company. An employee sees growth, spending and hiring from the inside. An outside buyer may have only public reporting, press coverage, the last financing price and whatever the platform can provide.
Buyers price the risk that the company is doing worse than the public picture suggests. Companies that run structured tender offers often provide buyers with financial information, which can narrow the gap. In an ordinary platform trade with limited information, buyers tend to bid more cautiously.
How does the type of buyer change the price?
Different buyers price the same shares differently. Three kinds of buyer are common on secondary platforms:
- Special purpose vehicles (SPVs) raised to buy one company’s stock. Their investors have committed to that one company, so SPVs can be among the more aggressive bidders for companies in high demand.
- Funds that buy across many companies. They price each position against portfolio targets and their own return requirements.
- Direct buyers, such as family offices, hedge funds and secondary-focused funds. They often do more diligence and may move more slowly.
Which buyers are active for a given company at a given time affects the clearing price. A company in high demand can draw SPV bids close to or above recent financing prices, while a company with a flat or falling valuation may draw only cautious fund bids.
How does a stale 409A compound the gap?
A stale 409A compounds the gap because the 409A and the secondary market may be measuring at different times. A 409A prepared ten months earlier reflects the company and the market as they were then. If valuations for comparable companies have fallen since, secondary buyers price the current environment, and bids fall below the 409A.
The reverse also happens. A company that raised a priced round at a much higher valuation a few months ago may see secondary bids above the old 409A, as buyers price toward the new preferred price with their own discounts. Under the 409A regulations, the company’s next valuation would need to reflect that new information.
How do buyers use the latest preferred price?
Many buyers anchor on the latest preferred price per share and then discount for the common stock’s position behind the preference, for time to liquidity and for information. If the last preferred round priced at $40 and the 409A reads $20, buyers may triangulate somewhere between, depending on demand. If the 409A is $20 but the last preferred round was a down round at $15, buyers start from the lower figure.
How do sellers set a realistic reserve price?
Sellers set a realistic reserve price by starting from evidence of what buyers are paying. The most useful inputs are the platform’s recent indications and closed trades for the company, if available, the latest preferred price and the terms of the preference stack, the current 409A, and the price of any recent company tender offer.
Several platforms publish indicative bid and ask ranges or recent trade prices for companies they cover. If bids cluster around $11 to $12 and the 409A is $18, that cluster is what the market will pay now, whatever the 409A says.
A reserve well above the observed bids may mean waiting a long time for an unusual buyer or not selling at all. A reserve at or below the bids sells faster. Taxes matter for the net result too: gain on shares held more than one year is long-term, and for a single filer in 2026 the 20% rate applies above $545,500 of taxable income, plus the 3.8% net investment income tax for higher earners. The secondary sale tax timing guide covers the holding period question.
Questions people ask next
Does the secondary-market discount narrow as a company approaches an IPO?
The gap between secondary prices and expected public value usually narrows as an IPO becomes more likely, because the buyer's wait for liquidity shortens and the chance of a low-value exit falls. A lockup after the IPO, commonly negotiated with underwriters, and uncertainty about the IPO price still apply. How much the gap narrows for any particular company depends on market conditions and demand.
Does a company tender offer price show the fair value of private stock?
A company tender offer price is the price at which the company or its chosen buyers agree to purchase shares in that program. It reflects negotiation among the company, the buyers and sometimes investors, and it can be above or below platform bids. It is a useful reference point, but it is not a tax valuation and does not bind a secondary buyer pricing a separate trade.
How do transfer restrictions on private shares affect the price?
Transfer restrictions such as a company right of first refusal add time and the risk that the company takes the deal, and some buyers lower their bids for that. Shares in companies that approve transfers quickly, or that run programs with approved buyers, can attract more buyers. The company's transfer provisions and process are part of what a buyer prices.
Why do secondary bids for the same company cluster together?
Secondary bids for the same company tend to cluster because buyers look at the same information: the latest financing price, the preference stack, recent trades and the company's prospects. Platforms also show buyers each other's indications and recent prices, which pulls bids together. Clustering reflects shared inputs rather than coordination.
Is it better to wait for a tender offer or an IPO than to sell on a secondary market?
Waiting can lead to a tender offer, an IPO or an acquisition at a higher value, or to a down round, a low-value sale or no exit at all. The comparison is between a certain price today, reinvested elsewhere, and the uncertain value of continuing to hold. Each holder weighs that trade-off with their own finances and concentration in mind.
Sources
- Rev. Proc. 2025-32irs.gov
Supporting text
Heads of Household $66,200 $579,600 All Other Individuals $49,450 $545,500
- IRS Topic no. 559, Net investment income taxirs.gov
Supporting text
A 3.8 percent net investment income tax (NIIT) applies to individuals, estates, and trusts that have net investment income above applicable threshold amounts.
- Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(iv)(B)(2)(i), independent appraisal presumption (eCFR)ecfr.gov
Supporting text
A valuation of a class of stock determined by an independent appraisal that meets the requirements of section 401(a)(28)(C) and the regulations as of a date that is no more than 12 months before the relevant transaction
Facts checked November 21, 2026 · Tax year 2026
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