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Sunk-Cost Fallacy With Underwater Options

By VestedGrant Editorial · Updated · Tax year 2026 · 8 min read

Martin Johnson Heade, York Harbor, Coast of Maine, 1877

An underwater option has a strike price above the stock's current value, so exercising it means paying more for shares than the market charges. The sunk-cost fallacy makes employees exercise or hold such options because of the years spent earning them. ISO tax treatment also requires exercise within 3 months of leaving employment, so a departure forces the decision quickly.

Facts checked November 21, 2026 · Figures for tax year 2026 · 6 sources

Key takeaways

  1. An option with a $50 strike on stock trading at $30 has no intrinsic value; exercising 40,000 such options in a hypothetical costs $2,000,000 for shares worth $1,200,000.
  2. For a public company, exercising an underwater option is always more expensive than buying the same shares on the market.
  3. ISO tax treatment requires the holder to have been an employee within 3 months before exercise; after that, a plan may still allow exercise, but as a nonqualified option.
  4. Under Section 424(h), repricing or extending an option is treated as granting a new option, which restarts the ISO holding periods.
  5. AMT paid on an ISO exercise is not refunded if the stock falls; it can become a minimum tax credit carried forward on Form 8801, and selling in the same year as exercise removes the AMT adjustment.

A stock option is a right to buy stock at a fixed strike price. If the stock trades below the strike, the option is underwater and its intrinsic value is zero. The option keeps some time value until it expires, but for a deeply underwater option with little time left, the time value is close to zero as well.

Economically, deeply underwater options are close to worthless. Psychologically, they stay on the mental cap table as “my 40,000 options.” Employees spend years in decision frames that treat underwater options as real. They count them in retirement plans. They turn down job offers to avoid forfeiting them. Some even exercise them on the way out the door rather than “lose” them.

This pattern is the sunk-cost fallacy: the belief that past investment, here the years spent earning the options, justifies continued commitment regardless of current value. This article walks through the trap and the rules that apply to underwater options. Prices and share counts in the examples are hypothetical.

What does it mean for an option to be underwater?

An option is underwater when its strike price is above the stock’s current value. Take a hypothetical option with a $50 strike on stock trading at $30: it is $20 underwater per share. Across 40,000 options, that is an $800,000 gap. The option has intrinsic value only if the stock rises above $50 before expiration.

An option-pricing model such as Black-Scholes values the time left on the option using the time to expiration, the stock’s volatility and the gap between price and strike. A deeply out-of-the-money option with a few months left has very little model value, because the stock would need a large move in a short time. The same option with years remaining has more value, because there is more time for a recovery. The exact figure depends heavily on the volatility input.

For private-company options, the model is rougher still. There is no market price, only a 409A valuation, and the volatility input is an estimate. A private option that is underwater against the 409A value may still carry some value if the company’s outcomes are widely spread. That value is real but speculative, and it cannot be realized until a liquidity event.

How does the sunk-cost frame push employees to exercise?

The sunk-cost frame pushes employees to exercise by treating the exercise as a way to “keep” past effort. The reasoning usually runs:

  • “I earned these options over four years of work.”
  • “If I leave, I forfeit unvested options and have a short window to exercise the vested ones.”
  • “Exercising costs real cash: $50 strike times 40,000 options is $2,000,000.”
  • “But if I don’t exercise, I lose everything I worked for.”
  • “So I should exercise to preserve the value.”

Each step feels logical. The conclusion is wrong when the options are deeply underwater, because exercising converts $2,000,000 of cash into 40,000 shares worth $1,200,000 at $30. The $800,000 loss is locked in at exercise. If the stock falls further, the loss grows.

The fallacy treats the $2,000,000 as “not a real outlay” because it “saves” the options. In fact, the exercise is a brand-new $2,000,000 investment in a stock that has underperformed. The test question is: “If I had $2,000,000 in cash and no options, would I put all of it into this stock at $30?” If the answer is no, the exercise fails the same test.

Why is buying on the market better than exercising?

For a public company, buying on the market is always better than exercising an underwater option, because the market price is lower than the strike. In the example, $2,000,000 buys 40,000 shares through exercise but about 66,667 shares on the market at $30.

The comparison holds even if the stock recovers. If it climbs to $60, the 40,000 exercised shares are worth $2,400,000, while the 66,667 market-bought shares are worth about $4,000,000. Anyone confident enough in a recovery to exercise should, by the same logic, prefer to buy on the market.

Cashless exercise and same-day sale do not help either. A same-day sale captures the spread between market price and strike; when the option is underwater, there is no spread to capture. A cashless exercise funded by selling shares produces nothing when every share sold brings in less than its strike. These mechanics only work for options in the money.

For a private company, there is usually no market alternative, which is the one case where exercising may be the only way to own the shares. Even then, the same test applies: whether the employee would invest that amount of cash in that company at the current 409A value.

How do post-termination exercise windows work?

Post-termination exercise windows are set by the option plan and grant, and they interact with a statutory rule for ISOs. For incentive stock option treatment, the holder must have been an employee of the company, or a parent or subsidiary, at all times from grant until 3 months before the exercise. An ISO exercised later than that is treated as a nonqualified option for tax purposes, if the plan allows the exercise at all.

Many plans set a 90-day window that matches the ISO rule. Some companies offer longer windows, such as a year or the full option term, to some or all departing employees. An extension of the exercise period is a modification, and Section 424(h) treats a modification of an ISO as the grant of a new option, which can affect its ISO status.

The short window creates a specific trap. An employee leaving with underwater options has weeks to decide, exercising costs cash, and not exercising forfeits the options. For deeply underwater options, the economics point toward not exercising; the sunk-cost fallacy points the other way.

When can exercising underwater options be defensible?

Exercising underwater options is defensible only with a specific, evidence-based thesis and no cheaper way to buy the shares. For public-company options, the market is always cheaper, so the case almost never holds. For private-company options, the employee needs a reason to believe the shares are worth more than the strike and a willingness to commit that much cash to one illiquid position.

Former employees who exercise underwater options to “not lose” them often end up with concentrated positions in a company they no longer work for. They lose the context that came with working there, and they still carry all of the single-company risk.

A defensible thesis reads like “the company has a signed contract that is not reflected in the last valuation, and I am willing to put $2,000,000 into one private stock.” A thesis that reads “I worked hard for these options” is sunk-cost rationalization.

How should an employee evaluate a repricing offer?

An employee should evaluate a repricing offer on its own terms, as a new trade. Some companies respond to stock declines by offering to exchange underwater options for new ones. A hypothetical exchange: surrender 10,000 options with a $50 strike for 6,000 options with a $30 strike at the current price. The smaller count compensates the company for the lower strike.

The exchange improves the employee’s position in most scenarios where the stock rises modestly, because the new strike is much easier to reach. It can be worse in scenarios where the stock recovers far above $50, because the employee holds fewer options. Comparing the two packages at several future prices shows where the break-even sits.

Tax rules follow the new grant. Under Section 424(h), a modification such as a repricing is treated as granting a new option, so for ISOs the 2-year-from-grant holding period restarts. Options are generally exempt from Section 409A only when the strike is not below fair market value on the grant date, so a repricing needs to set the new strike at or above current value. Public companies may also need shareholder approval under their plan or exchange rules.

Should AMT already paid keep an employee holding ISO shares?

AMT already paid should not keep an employee holding ISO shares, because the tax is a sunk cost that holding cannot recover. The related trap: an employee exercises ISOs while the stock is above the strike, owes AMT on the spread, then watches the stock fall and refuses to sell because “I’d still owe the AMT and wouldn’t get anything back.”

Timing matters here. If the shares are sold in the same calendar year as the exercise, no AMT adjustment is required, so a falling stock can be sold before December 31 to avoid the AMT on that exercise. Once the year closes, the AMT for that year stands.

AMT paid on an ISO spread is not refunded when the stock later falls. It can, however, create a minimum tax credit, figured on Form 8801 and carried forward to years when regular tax exceeds the tentative minimum tax. The decision whether to hold the shares now should rest on their current value, not on recovering a tax that has already been paid.

What are the steps for dealing with underwater options?

Dealing with underwater options comes down to a few steps that separate past effort from present value.

  1. Estimate the current value. For public options, an option-pricing model with current inputs shows how much time value remains. For private options, the 409A value and a realistic range of outcomes give a rough estimate. A value near zero means the option should be treated as close to worthless.

  2. Avoid exercising early while still employed. Vested options generally stay exercisable until expiration or departure, so there is rarely a reason to exercise underwater options while still at the company.

  3. On departure, compare the cost with the alternatives. For public stock, the market price is the alternative, and it is lower. For private stock, the question is whether the employee would invest that cash in that company at today’s value. Borrowing to exercise underwater options adds leverage to an already poor trade.

  4. Apply the hypothetical-cash test when the window is closing. “Would I buy this much of this stock at this price with this much cash?” If the answer is no, letting the options lapse is the consistent choice.

  5. Leave underwater options out of net worth. They are closer to a lottery ticket than an asset. If the stock recovers, the upside is a bonus; if not, nothing beyond time already spent is lost.

Questions people ask next

Can I sell my underwater options to someone else?

Employee stock options usually cannot be sold. Incentive stock options must by statute be nontransferable except at death, and most plans impose the same restriction on nonqualified options. Even where a transfer were allowed, a deeply underwater option has little value to a buyer. The realistic choices are to hold the option until it expires or to let it lapse.

If I exercise and the stock keeps falling, can I deduct the loss?

A loss on shares acquired by exercise is a capital loss when the shares are sold. The basis is the price paid plus any amount included in income at exercise, such as the NSO spread. Capital losses offset capital gains, and up to $3,000 a year of excess loss ($1,500 if married filing separately) offsets ordinary income, with the rest carried forward.

What if I believe the stock will recover in two or three years?

A belief in recovery is a thesis only if it is specific: a named product, a dated catalyst, a reason the market is wrong. Even a strong thesis favors buying shares on the market over exercising an underwater public-company option, because the market price is lower than the strike. Exercising makes sense only when the shares cannot be bought any other way, as with private companies.

Can I ask for a longer exercise window when I leave?

An employee can ask for a longer post-termination exercise window, and some companies grant one in plan terms or a separation agreement. A longer window removes the time pressure. An incentive stock option exercised more than 3 months after employment ends is taxed as a nonqualified option, and extending the window is a modification that the tax rules treat as a new grant.

Does Section 409A affect an option repricing?

Section 409A can affect a repricing. Stock options are generally exempt from Section 409A only if the exercise price is never below the stock's fair market value on the grant date, and a repricing counts as a new grant measured on the repricing date. A properly structured repricing sets the new strike at or above current fair market value; the company's counsel normally handles this.

Sources

  1. IRS Topic no. 409, Capital gains and lossesirs.gov
    Supporting text
    the amount of the excess loss that you can claim to lower your income is the lesser of $3,000 ($1,500 if married filing separately)
  2. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (Incentive stock options)uscode.house.gov
    Supporting text
    no disposition of such share is made by him within 2 years from the date of the granting of the option nor within 1 year after the transfer of such share to him,
  3. 26 U.S.C. § 424, Definitions and special rulesuscode.house.gov
    Supporting text
    if the terms of any option to purchase stock are modified, extended, or renewed, such modification, extension, or renewal shall be considered as the granting of a new option
  4. IRS Publication 525, Taxable and Nontaxable Incomeirs.gov
    Supporting text
    However, no adjustment is required if you dispose of the stock in the same year you exercise the option.
  5. 26 CFR 1.409A-1, Definitions and covered plans (eCFR)ecfr.gov
    Supporting text
    The exercise price may never be less than the fair market value of the underlying stock
  6. IRS Instructions for Form 8801irs.gov
    Supporting text
    to figure the minimum tax credit, if any, for alternative minimum tax (AMT) you incurred in prior tax years and to figure any credit carryforward to 2026

Facts checked November 21, 2026 · Tax year 2026

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